Question: Is it permissible to speak lashon ha’ra about a person who is constantly arguing and fighting with others?

Short Answer: In limited circumstances, such as to prevent future fighting, and with certain limitations, one may speak lashon ha’ra about a person who starts fights and arguments.

Explanation:

I. The Source

The Yerushalmi (Pei’ah 1:1) write that it is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about “baalei machlokes” – people generally involved in disputes. The Yerushalmi proves this halachah from the story in the beginning of Sefer M’lachim, where Nasan HaNavi tells Bas-Sheva that he will support her words to David HaMelech. She was going to tell David HaMelech that the nation had proclaimed Adoniyahu as the new king. This was lashon ha’ra, but it was permitted because it was about Adoniyahu (and his supporters) who were engaged in the dispute with the future king, Shlomo HaMelech, and any other potential heirs to the throne.

The Shaarei T’shuvah (shaar 3:58) similarly cites p’sukim from this story to show that lashon ha’ra is permitted against an argumentative person who causes fights and discord. The Sefer Chasidim (631) goes even further, ruling that it is a mitzvah to speak lashon ha’ra about such a fighter.

 

II. Dasan and Aviram

Many Acharonim ask the same question on the above Yerushalmi. The pasuk (BaMidbar 16:14) states, “Ha’einei ha’anashim haheim t’nakeir?” – that the messenger that Moshe sent to speak to Dasan and Aviram returned to Moshe and told him the negative words that Dasan and Aviram spoke about Moshe. The Gemara (Moed Katan 16a) learns from this pasuk that it is permitted for a messenger of Beis Din to report all the negative details back to Beis Din without violating the laws of lashon ha’ra, as seen from the messenger to Dasan and Aviram.

What is the proof of the Gemara? If it is truly permitted, based on the Yerushalmi to speak lashon ha’ra about a fighter, how can the Gemara (Moed Kattan) prove anything about a messenger of Beis Din from this story? Perhaps the messenger only reported details back to Moshe because it was about fighters such as Dasan and Aviram? What is the source that a messenger may even report details about a person who is not necessarily a perpetual fighter?

 

III. Potential Answers

While the Shulchan Aruch never codifies this halachah, the Magen Avraham (Orach Chayim 156:2) does cite the ruling of the Yerushalmi that it is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about a fighter. However, the Magen Avraham qualifies this ruling based on the Smak, that it is only permitted to speak the lashon ha’ra to someone kosher like David HaMelech. The sefer Meir Oz (Orach Chayim 156) cites the sefer Gilyon HaShas (on Yerushalmi, not Rabbi Akiva Eiger) who rules similarly, that it is only permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about a fighter if the speech will prevent future machlokes. Accordingly, the Meir Oz explains that this answers the above question. The messenger was not permitted to tell Moshe the lashon ha’ra that Dasan and Aviram spoke based on the Yerushalmi, as Moshe was “involved” in the dispute and telling him would not prevent future machlokes. Thus, the fact that it was permitted for the messenger to do so must be because of another leniency; hence the Gemara in Moed Katan’s proof that a messenger of Beis Din may always relay the words of the litigant to the Beis Din.

The Iyun HaParshah pamphlet (Bein Adam L’Chaveiro, p. 290) asked this question to numerous g’dolim. Rav Chaim Kanievsky responded that the leniency for a messenger of Beis Din is the same as a fighter, as a messenger of Beis Din is reporting information from a litigant, who is by definition a fighter. On the other hand, Rav Moshe Sternbuch responded that Korach (Ed.: presumably, Dasan and Aviram, as well) were not considered fighters, as they were ostensibly coming to Moshe with halachic arguments, and their k’tores and pan offerings were considered kodesh. Thus, the messenger was only permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about them under the guise of the separate leniency of the Gemara in Moed Kattan.

Rav Pinchas Hirschprung zt”l (cited in Yeshurun, Vol. 26, p. 287) gives a creative answer. The entire source that it is forbidden to be a fighter is from Korach (see Sanhedrin 110a), and thus it was not permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about a fighter until we “learned” the prohibition of being a rabble-rouser from Korach, which did not occur until after Korach was punished and killed.

The Maadanei Asher (5767, Korach) cites the Chasam Sofer, who gives a different answer. It is only permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about a fighter when you are informing the other party about the dispute. Once the dispute is revealed, it is forbidden for anyone to speak further about the fighter. Thus, because Moshe was already aware of the dispute with Korach, Dasan, and Aviram, it was forbidden to speak lashon ha’ra about them. The Gemara in Moed Kattan is therefore able to infer that a messenger of Beis Din may speak lashon ha’ra to Beis Din even if the dispute is already known.

The Maadanei Asher (ibid) likewise cites the Netziv, who answers that it is only permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about a fighter if it won’t cause the fighter damage. Here, however, Korach and Co. were killed due to the lashon ha’ra. Thus, the only leniency must be that a messenger of Beis Din is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra.

The upshot of the above answers is that the leniency to speak about a fighter is extremely limited. It only applies to inform others of the dispute and nothing more (Chasam Sofer), when it will prevent future fighting (Gilyon HaShas), and when it won’t cause damage to the fighter (Netziv).

 

IV. The Chofetz Chaim

The Chofetz Chaim (klal 8:8) cites the Yerushalmi in the name of “some say” that it is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra about fighters. He elaborates (B’eir Mayim Chayim, ibid) that the Rosh, Rif, and Rambam do not codify this halachah at all, perhaps because these poskim feel that the Yerushalmi is a blanket leniency, which is contrary to the Gemara (Moed Kattan) which obviously felt the leniency is qualified based on the above answers. Indeed, the Chofetz Chaim himself notes that the leniency to speak lashon ha’ra only applies (even according to the lenient poskim) where it will prevent future machlokes (like the Gilyon HaShas above).

The Chofetz Chaim also adds three prongs that must be satisfied before one speaks lashon ha’ra about a fighter: (i) He has first-hand knowledge that the person is a fighter; (ii) He intends to stop the machlokes (as opposed to speaking out of hatred); and (iii) There is no alternative way to prevent the fighting.

Interestingly, the Dirshu edition of Chofetz Chaim (klal 8:8, fn. 21) cites Rav Elchonon Wasserman zt”l, who explained the reasoning behind this leniency. Aveiros between a person and his friend are suspended if there is a valid purpose for doing the aveirah, such as preventing the fight here. [As an aside, Rav Elchonon appears to be interpreting lashon ha’ra as a purely bein adam l’chaveiro prohibition, see Article #1].


 Rabbi Ephraim Glatt, Esq. is Associate Rabbi at the Young Israel of Kew Gardens Hills and a practicing litigation attorney. Questions? Comments? Email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.