Question: Is it permitted to speak lashon ha’ra where your words have a productive purpose (to’eles) but are also said out of hatred?
Short Answer: It is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra for a productive purpose (such as preventing future harm) even if your words are also motivated by hatred, as long as you will definitely prevent the future harm with your words. Some allow such speech regardless of if the primary motivation is to prevent harm.
Explanation:
I. For a Purpose
The Chofetz Chaim (Lashon HaRa, klal 10:1-3) writes that it is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra in order to help someone recoup money, such as speaking about a thief who otherwise will refuse to return the stolen money.
However, the Chofetz Chaim lists seven criteria that must first be satisfied in order for the abovementioned leniency to apply. First, the speaker must have personally witnessed the theft or bad act about which he is speaking. If he heard about it from someone else, he may not speak about it until he verifies the accuracy himself. Second, the speaker must clarify that the bad act that he witnessed or verified is truly theft or a tort (or the like) according to the Torah. Third, the speaker must first confront the tortfeasor or thief and softly encourage him to return the money or pay damages. Only if the person refuses may the speaker spread word of the incident to others. Fourth, the speaker may not exaggerate the details of the bad act when revealing it to others. Fifth, the speaker may only tell others if his intention is to prevent loss or for another worthwhile purpose. It is forbidden for him to tell others if he benefits from the lashon ha’ra based on his own prior hatred of the person being spoken about. Sixth, the speaker may only say the lashon ha’ra if there is no other way to achieve his same goal differently (and without speaking the lashon ha’ra). Seventh, the speaker may not cause extra damage to the thief or tortfeasor; his words must only lead to the proper punishment/restitution.
The Chofetz Chaim (R’chilus, klal 9:1-3) likewise lists many of these criteria, including the fifth criterion above, that the speaker may only tell others if his intention is to prevent loss or for another worthwhile purpose. It is forbidden for him to tell others if he benefits from the lashon ha’ra based on his own prior hatred of the person being spoken about.
But what about where the speaker intends his negative speech for a productive and permitted purpose, but also is happy to speak negatively against the person because he hates him. Is it permitted to do so?
II. Smacking Your Friend
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 421:13) cites a case where a person (Reuven) sees someone else (Shimon) being hit by a third person (Levi). The rule is that Reuven may hit Levi to stop him from hitting Shimon if there is no other method to prevent Levi from hitting Shimon. The Shulchan Aruch explains that Reuven may hit Levi because he is preventing Levi from doing an aveirah, namely hitting Shimon.
However, the Tur, when citing this case, adds a different case. A person (Reuven) is permitted to hit a person (Levi) who is hitting his (i.e., Reuven’s) father or relative. The reason is because it is permitted to hit someone to save your relative from being hit.
Why are these two cases listed separately (and with separate reasons) in the Tur?
III. Two Competing Answers
Two different answers are provided.
The S”ma (ibid. 28) explains that there is a tremendous ramification between the cases – whether Reuven is permitted to hit Levi even where Reuven generally does NOT prevent people from doing aveiros. It is only permitted if Levi is hitting Reuven’s relative, as there is a special leniency to hit someone who is hurting your relative. However, Reuven may not hit Levi if Levi is hitting another person such as Shimon because invariably there is an element of hatred for Levi motivating Reuven’s actions, as he normally does not wade into fights to prevent people from doing aveiros. Since Reuven’s actions are partly motivated by hate for Levi, he may not hit him, even if a permitted result (Levi will no longer be doing an aveirah) would result from the action.
The Taz (ibid) disagrees with the distinction of the S”ma. If the result is permitted, it doesn’t matter whether Reuven hates Levi or not; Reuven is permitted to hit him to stop Levi from hitting anyone, a relative or non-relative such as Shimon. Rather, there is a different distinction between the cases. When Levi hits Reuven’s relative, Reuven need not analyze too hard whether there is another, less violent manner to save his relative; he can simply whack Levi. However, when Levi hits a non-relative such as Shimon, Reuven must carefully analyze whether there is a less violent manner with which to save Shimon before smacking Levi.
IV. Application To Lashon HaRa
The Chofetz Chaim (R’chilus, klal 9, B’eir Mayim Chayim 28, hagahah) cites the machlokes between the S”ma and the Taz, and applies it to our case of lashon ha’ra, where the speaker hates the subject of his speech, but his speech has a productive purpose. The S”ma would seemingly forbid the speaker to say the lashon ha’ra based on his hatred for the subject being spoken about, while the Taz would seemingly permit the speaker to say the lashon ha’ra precisely because of its productive purpose and regardless of any accompanying hatred.
However, the Chofetz Chaim concludes that even the Taz would agree that by lashon ha’ra it would be forbidden in our case, as the hatred of the speaker would likely prevent him from properly fulfilling the other six criteria necessary before speaking the lashon ha’ra.
V. The Contradiction
The Dirshu edition of the Chofetz Chaim (Lashon HaRa, klal 10, n. 24) notes an apparent contradiction in the Chofetz Chaim. In B’eir Mayim Chayim (R’chilus, klal 9, n. 3), the Chofetz Chaim writes that it is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra if it prevents damage, even though the speaker is also motivated by hatred for the person being spoken about. This appears to be in contrast with the above ruling that such lashon ha’ra is forbidden.
The Dirshu edition answers the seeming contradiction by explaining that it is permitted to speak lashon ha’ra even if motivated by hatred when it will certainly prevent future harm to someone, but it is forbidden to do so if the prevention of future harm is possible but not definite. See also Kovetz Beis Aharon v’Yisrael (Vol. 108, p. 72).
Moreover, the Dirshu edition (ibid) cites Rav Chaim Kanievsky zt”l who ruled that it is even fine to speak lashon ha’ra if motivated by hatred as long as your primary motivation is to prevent harm to someone else.
VI. A Suggestion
Perhaps a proof that the speaker must have only pure intentions can be found in the words of the Divrei Yetziv (Yoreh Dei’ah 2:4). The Divrei Yetziv explains why it is important that the town shochet be a y’rei shamayim b’rabbim (a public tzadik). Because slaughtering is fundamentally a “bad” act (i.e., it is violent), the entire nature of the act is based on intent, which is not known to any bystander. Thus, the shochet must have a good reputation as a tzadik. The Divrei Yetziv further compares the shochet to our halachah by lashon ha’ra, that the speaker – who is doing a fundamentally bad act of speaking negatively – must have noble intentions to make the act permitted.
Thus, this author suggests that because the act of lashon ha’ra is completely based on the intention of the speaker, the intent must be completely pure and devoid of any ulterior motives such as hatred of the person being spoken about.
Rabbi Ephraim Glatt, Esq. is Associate Rabbi at the Young Israel of Kew Gardens Hills and a practicing litigation attorney. Questions? Comments? Email This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..
